License log anonymizer

Strip usernames, hostnames, domains and IP addresses out of FlexLM, RLM and LM-X logs before you send them to vendor support or paste them into a forum. Runs entirely in your browser; nothing is uploaded.

Sooner or later you have to hand a license log to someone outside your organization. Vendor support asks for your lmstat output. Or you paste a debug log into a forum thread because somebody there has clearly seen this error before — where it stays public, and indexed, for years.

Either way you are sharing a file that carries personally identifiable information — usernames and workstation names — alongside internal organizational details such as internal hostnames and domains, IP addresses, and feature usage.

This tool replaces every identifier with a consistent placeholder — jsmith becomes user001 everywhere it appears, including the display column and the server header. The log still shows support what they need: the same user holding three features across two servers, at the same times, in the same order. A sed one-liner that blanks everything to XXXX destroys exactly that.

Privacy

Your log data stays on this device

The file is read and rewritten in your browser — it is never uploaded, and no server sees its contents, its name, or anything we detected in it. Loading this page is an ordinary web request like any other; once it has loaded, you can disconnect from the network and the tool keeps working.

The mapping that reverses the placeholders is built in memory on every run — it has to be, to keep the replacements consistent. It is only written to a file if you download it. Keep it, because you will want it when support replies about “user001”, but never send it with the log or in the same ticket thread.

Supported: FlexLM (debug log and lmstat -a), RLM (debug log and rlmstat -a), LM-X (server log and -licstat). DSLS and Sentinel RMS are not supported by this tool yet — LiMon itself monitors DSLS in full.

Choose a log

Drop a file here, pick one, or paste the text below. It is read on this device and never sent anywhere.

What to replace

Feature names are left alone by default: support usually needs them, and they are rarely personal data. Tick the box if your application portfolio is confidential.

Reverse a reply

Paste the vendor's reply and your mapping file to turn the placeholders back into real names. Names come back in the spelling recorded when you scrubbed.

Why not just scrub the log with sed?

The usual approach is a one-liner that redacts every username to XXXX. It works, and it ruins the log: once every user is XXXX, nobody can see that one person held three features at once, that the same workstation appears on two servers, or that the denials all came from a single machine. Support then asks for the unredacted file, which is where you started.

Masking each value to its own placeholder is what keeps the log readable while removing the personal data. That is the whole difference between this and a search-and-replace, and it is why the mapping exists: user001 means the same person for the length of the conversation.

What about lmobfslog and rlmanon?

Both vendors ship something, and if one fits your case you should use it.

Revenera’s lmobfslog obfuscates FlexNet debug logs, but it depends on the log having been produced with the right option in place — it does not help with a log you already have, or with a captured lmstat -a. Reprise’s rlmanon targets RLM report logs rather than the debug log, and is not reachable through rlmutil.

This tool covers what they do not: a debug log you already collected, status output you just captured, an LM-X server log, or anything you are about to paste into a public thread. It also handles all three license managers in one place, without installing anything.

Is this GDPR anonymization?

Strictly, this is pseudonymization: reversible, but only by whoever holds the mapping. Your recipient does not get it, so they cannot reverse it from the scrubbed file alone. The CJEU has confirmed that the same pseudonymized data can be personal data for the sender and not personal data for a recipient who holds no key and cannot identify people by other means (EDPS v SRB, C-413/23 P, 4 September 2025) — the test being “means reasonably likely to be used” (GDPR Recital 26).

What we cannot judge from here is whether your recipient could still identify someone by other means. They know which customer opened the ticket, and a four-person CATIA team is a small crowd. That call is yours.

If in doubt, ask your DPO, internal counsel or HR before sharing anything that identifies employees. We build monitoring software; we are not your lawyers.

All tools

Built by the people behind LiMon — on-premises license monitoring for FlexLM, RLM, LM-X and DSLS. Same principle as this page: your data stays on your own infrastructure, with no agents and no phone-home.